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A concept in flux: questioning accountability in
the context of global health cooperation
Carlos Bruen1*, Ruairí Brugha1, Angela Kageni2 and Francis Wafula2
Abstract
Background: Accountability in global health is a commonly invoked though less commonly questioned concept.
Critically reflecting on the concept and how it is put into practice, this paper focuses on the who, what, how, and
where of accountability, mapping its defining features and considering them with respect to real-world circumstances.
Changing dynamics in global health cooperation - such as the emergence of new health public-private partnerships
and the formal inclusion of non-state actors in policy making processes - provides the backdrop to this discussion.
Discussion: Accountability is frequently reduced to one set of actors holding another to account. Changes in the
global health landscape and in relations between actors have however made the practice of accountability more
complex and contested. Currently undergoing a reframing process, participation and transparency have become
core elements of a new accountability agenda alongside evaluation and redress or enforcement mechanisms.
However, while accountability is about holding actors responsible for their actions, the mechanisms through
which this might be done vary substantially and are far from politically neutral.
Accountability in global health cooperation involves multipolar relationships between a large number of
stakeholders with varying degrees of power and influence, where not all interests are realised in that relationship.
Moreover, accountability differs across finance, programme and governance subfields, where each has its own set
of policy processes, institutional structures, accountability relations and power asymmetries to contend with. With
reference to the Global Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, this paper contributes to discussions on
accountability by mapping out key elements of the concept and how it is put into practice, where different types
of accountability battle for recognition and legitimacy.
Summary: In mapping some defining features, accountability in global health cooperation is shown to be a complex
problem not necessarily reducible to one set of actors holding another to account. Clear tensions are observed
between multi-stakeholder participatory models and more traditional vertical models that prioritise accountability
upwards to donors, both of which are embodied in initiatives like the Global Fund. For multi-constituency
organisations, this poses challenges not only for future financing but also for future legitimacy.
Keywords: Accountability, Global health, Health policy analysis, Global Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis
and Malaria
Background
Writing in his weekly column, The Lancet editor Richard
Horton remarked that global health has experienced a
recent revolution in accountability, with improved metrics
increasingly linked to politics and decision-making in ways
that seek to create “the right political conditions for data to
have an impact on health and health policy” [1]. Substantial
changes in the global health landscape since the late 1990s
have served to intensify demands for greater accountability,
including: increases in funding for specific diseases or in-
terventions; a growth in the number of state and non-state
actors involved in the making, financing and implementa-
tion of health policies; and more diverse channels for fund-
ing global health projects and programmes [2]. However,
as both a concept and in practice, accountability is infused
with different meanings, criteria and standards depending
on who uses the term, whether managers, policy makers,
researchers, advocates, or health professionals. Consequently,
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it has become a malleable, contested and widely extended
concept, in so far as it is applied in different ways across a
multi-layered and non-linear global health system within
which diverse lines of accountability between different sets
of actors compete or complement one another.
Accountability in the context of these converging glo-
bal health trends sets the background for this discussion
paper. We ask what is meant by accountability (or at
least what are the different understandings), who is to be
held accountable, and how, both conceptually and with
reference to real-world circumstances. Accountability in
practice is often underpinned by a Principal-Agent logic:
based on lead-subordinate roles, relations are structured
to incentivize Agents to act in the interests of the Princi-
pal or lead [3]. This is an expression of an institutional
power relation, whereby the Principal confines the range
of choices available to the Agent, thereby directing the
actions of the Agent to fulfil the priorities of the Principal.
Accountability mechanisms, such as monitoring and
evaluation activities, can play a functional role in these
relationships, in that they may be put in place to mitigate
unwanted opportunistic behaviour of Agents. Authority is
assigned to the Principal actor to seek rectification or
enforce sanctions when goals are not accomplished or
responsibilities not met [4,5]. More sophisticated forms of
Principal-Agent models set precise targets in projects,
often with a threat of penalties or punishment for poor
performance, in order to reduce the risk of capture and
improper use of funds in foreign aid relations [6], or to en-
hance health system performance and service delivery [7].
Viewed critically, however, such a narrow application
of accountability corresponds closely with what Fidler
describes as ‘foreign policy preferences that ruthlessly
winnow complex problems into defined tasks with meas-
urable targets’ [8]. Moreover, compliance and punishment
often dominate over other possible responses, most not-
ably opportunities for information generation, learning
and organisational change. While remarkably pervasive,
the empirical reality of global health does not always lend
itself to readily identifiable Principals and Agents, nor does
this model adequately reflect the multiple accountabilities
that actors contend with [9,10]. Accountability in global
health is complex and subject to regular re-interpretation.
Should, for example, the World Health Organization or
the World Bank be accountable to the states who created
and continue to fund them, or should these organisations
be accountable to the people most affected by their pol-
icies? How can multiple stakeholders in these and other
organisations hold one another to account? Where does
the locus of responsibility lie? And who constitutes the
legitimate source of authority in a particular situation for
judging if responsibilities have been met?
In the section that follows, we question the who, what,
how, as well as the where of accountability. We examine
the changing and distributed nature of global health co-
operation, and consider this with respect to some of the
primary constituencies involved, e.g. populations affected
by diseases or programmes, governments, multilateral
organisations, philanthropies, private or non-governmental
organisations (NGOs); and in particular relatively recent
public-private partnerships like the Global Fund to Fight
AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (hereafter Global Fund)
that bring many of these actors together. Our aim here is
to reflect on the concept and practice of accountability in
the context of global health cooperation, and to identify
and chart some of its defining features. We then discuss
these features in relation to one of the newer public-
private partnerships to claim accountability as a core value,
the Global Fund.
Discussion
Changing dynamics of global health cooperation
A commonly accepted definition of accountability is the
condition of being responsible and answerable to some-
one for meeting performance or other activities, mea-
sured against a set of standards [7]. This model is based
on relations between at least two different actors with
different levels of resources. These relations assume the
existence of a higher authority with an oversight func-
tion [11]. By extension, this implies ‘that some actors
have the right to hold other actors to a set of standards,
to judge whether they have fulfilled their responsibilities
in light of these standards, and to impose sanctions if
they determine that these responsibilities have not been
met’ [12]. In international relations, some consider indi-
viduals as the ultimate source of responsibility - others,
however, argue that collective entities like states or
organisations also qualify as responsible agents who
have interests, deliberate on courses of action and their
consequences, have specific aims and duties, and should
thus be accountable for their actions [13].
Under principles of international law, the state has pri-
mary responsibility for ensuring the health needs of its
population is met, including responsibilities for ensuring
adequate health sector funding, for governing well, and
for addressing the socioeconomic determinants of health
[14]. Additionally, extraterritorial duties oblige wealthier
countries to support those countries unable to ensure
the basic health needs of their populations. While this
can take the form of financial or other assistance, issues
of jurisdiction, division of responsibility or the regulation
of non-state actors, among other things, can make this a
highly contested and difficult issue in national, bilateral
and multilateral arrangements [14-17].
While states are deemed responsible for health within
their borders, they have delegated some authority to inter-
state organisations like the World Health Organization
(WHO) to address health issues from a global level. The
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WHO, for example, is required to demonstrate internal
accountability within its secretariat and operational struc-
tures, and is, more broadly, formally accountable to member
governments, who in turn can influence strategic policy
decisions using the 'one state, one vote' system at the World
Health Assembly. In practice, representative decision-
making in multilateral organisations can be compromised
by organisational structures that allow for key agenda
setting decisions to be made outside of the representative
structures or through the provision of multiple ear-marked
funds that distort broader sectorial strategies [18].
As a result, critics have long argued that power differ-
entials make multilateral organisations like the WHO or
the World Bank more accountable and responsive to the
interests of some members over others, where small
groups of powerful states exert influence through formal
and informal channels [10,18,19]. Furthermore, while
the WHO may claim to be responsive solely to member
governments, the changing dynamics of global health
means that non-state actors like the Bill and Melinda
Gates Foundation, large companies or NGO networks
have a substantial influence over the financing, decision-
making or implementation activities of inter-state orga-
nisations like the WHO. The WHO itself continues to
struggle politically and organisationally with this issue,
encountering difficulties in formally codifying its engage-
ment with non-state actors. In the eyes of some, it risks
becoming irrelevant and outpaced by younger rivals like
the GAVI Alliance and the Global Fund who have
formally incorporated non-state actors in their decision-
making structures [20].
The challenges faced by the WHO reflect fundamental
changes in the dynamics of global health cooperation
since the 1990s, changes that impact a wide range of
actors and have in turn had knock-on consequences for
and initiated reinterpretations of accountability. NGOs,
philanthropic organisations and for-profit companies
have seen their power to influence extend across state
borders, into traditional inter-state structures, as well as
becoming incorporated into newer global health initia-
tives (GHIs) [21]. This has been coupled with demands
for better accountability of these actors, along with the
development of newer accountability methods, such as
peer regulation initiatives, voluntary codes of practice or
community accountability and transparency initiatives
[22-25]. The very nature of global health cooperation
has changed, shifting from vertical tiers of state repre-
sentation characterised by the WHO and the UN system
more broadly, towards more horizontal models of par-
ticipation of selected stakeholders in public-private part-
nerships [26]. GHIs like the Global Fund and the GAVI
Alliance exemplify these new forms of global cooper-
ation that bring together state and non-state actors,
formalising engagement for the purposes of resolving
specific health policy problems such as financing the
control of infectious diseases. While often praised for be-
ing more participative and transparent relative to other
global organisations, questions remain regarding to whom
global public-private organisations are in fact accountable
and responsive [27-29].
The rise of non-state actors and GHIs has revolutio-
nised the global health landscape. However, their influ-
ence and incorporation in global health decision-making
structures has raised concerns about overlapping and
competing mandates between public and private actors,
as well as risks involved with diluting responsibility
across a widening set of actors [26,30,31]. This is not to
suggest that accountability structures of the past were
somehow stronger, or that public actors like the WHO
or states are implicitly more accountable or legitimate.
Rather, changing global health dynamics and actor rela-
tions not only challenges traditional accountability struc-
tures but has also brought about a reframing process,
one that needs to be carefully observed. This is necessary
to avoid disempowering the concept, such as reducing it
to ideas of transparency or technocratic monitoring, or
allowing it be strategically employed as an instrument to
legitimize particular issue areas or the activities of specific
actors [32].
Changing dynamics of accountability
Accountability is a powerful concept. It is normative, in
so far as it is indicative of desired conditions, such as due
process, transparency or participatory decision-making
that will lead to better health or other outcomes [9]. Ac-
countability mechanisms and processes are in turn the
means through which these desired conditions might be
realised. Accountability processes and mechanisms are not
politically neutral however – they may reinforce existing
power relations or they may be agents of change. Rather
than simply assuming therefore that more monitoring,
regulation or sanctions will address problems of account-
ability, ‘one must look to the effects of those mechanisms
to understand their impacts and operations, rather than
the rhetoric that motivates and accompanies them’ [9].
In the context of global health cooperation, account-
ability is not simply a binary relationship where one set
of actors is held accountable to another. Real-world
accountability involves a multipolar relationship between
a large number of stakeholders with varying degrees of
power and influence, where not all interests or prefer-
ences are realised in that accountability relationship
[32]. Spatial metaphors are sometimes used to suggest
competing lines of accountability between different
groups of actors. Vertical lines of accountability flow
‘upward’, such as to funders or state agencies, or ‘down-
ward’, to citizens or those affected by services delivered,
raising related questions as to whether or not enforcement
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should rely on top-down or bottom-up mechanisms
[9,33]. Horizontal lines refer to inter-institutional mecha-
nisms, such as between executive and legislative state
agencies, or between actors in a delegate body or board
[34,35]. Hybrid forms of accountability attempt to bridge
the vertical-horizontal divide. Also termed diagonal ac-
countability, this can refer to direct citizen engagement
with more powerful public or private institutions through
mechanisms like joint state-civil society monitoring
initiatives or citizen auditing [34].
A single actor may at any one time be expected to give
account to numerous other actors, such as NGOs to
their donors, to their board, to the people affected by
their actions, or to the legal system in the country they are
registered or country they operate in. NGOs, like other
actors, are often caught in a dilemma between meeting
the accountability demands of one set of actors, such as
donors, while also being expected to give account to
communities they engage [33,36]. It is in this sense that
accountability is a multipolar relationship, one made
more complex by the fact that on occasion actors can
be both objects and agents of accountability, required to
be answerable while also seeking to hold others to
account [37].
Based on literature covering financial control, public
sector management reform, and governance, Brinkerhoff
specifies three types of accountability required for hold-
ing health actors to account [7]. Financial accountabil-
ity, the most commonly understood type, “concerns
tracking and reporting on allocation, disbursement and
utilization of financial resources, using the tools of audit-
ing, budgeting and accounting‘’ [7]. Equally importantly,
however, is that actors must also be accountable for per-
formance, which includes demonstrating results against
agreed programme targets. Finally, Brinkerhoff outlines
the importance of political accountability, and equates it
to governments delivering on electoral promises and
responding to the needs of citizens, with state-based polit-
ical processes and elections referenced as the main ac-
countability channels.
While this three-way classification of accountability
types is systematic, it does not take into account wider
health policy processes influencing accountability dy-
namics. In particular, the national and international ac-
tors who make or influence policy are largely neglected
here, as are the asymmetric relations between actors that
may lead to modes of accountability that are skewed to
favour the interests of more powerful actors. It is neces-
sary to also ask questions regarding who gets to decide
on or design accountability interventions, to set the
benchmarks or targets against which interventions or
decisions should be evaluated, and whether or not efforts
to improve accountability actually achieve their purported
aims. This means recognising ‘the relationships, demands
and power plays among actors…[where] numerous types
of accountability battle for recognition and legitimacy’ [9].
Mapping accountability mechanisms and policy subfields
The provision of information to people trying to hold
power-wielders to account, coupled with the ability to
demand answers and impose sanctions, appear in the
global governance and international relations literature
as core components of accountability and as mechanisms
for guarding against abuses of power [12,35]. Within this
literature, Hesselmann for instance considers transpar-
ency, answerability and enforcement as defining the first
and second stages of accountability, where each stage
demands progressively more from the actors being called
to account [32]. Accountability is only achieved when an
accountability-giver adapts its behaviour in response to
enforced sanctions or rewards, which is the third stage of
accountability. Weisband and Ebrahim similarly identify
four elements of accountability, namely transparency,
answerability, compliance and enforcement, each building
on the other and requiring enforceability if accountability
is to be realised [9].
Added to this, Woods and Narlikar note that mecha-
nisms for monitoring and evaluation are a prerequisite,
alongside some degree of transparency, and the ability to
enforce rules and seek redress [35]. Monitoring and
evaluation provides a means to generate information on
processes, decisions or outcomes of an institution or
programme, while transparency mechanisms facilitate
the availability of that information. It also provides a
critical link between accountability, organisational learn-
ing and behaviour change. This has its challenges, how-
ever, including the need for appropriate mechanisms to
be in place that ensure information generated from evalu-
ations finds its way back into decision-making processes,
and to ensure that the evaluation processes themselves are
not simply measuring performance to enforce compliance
or to punish, but are also a means for improvement [38].
A new accountability agenda has emerged in response
to democratic failures and pressures for generating new
ways of holding powerful actors to account, most
notably in the form of increased participation in formal
institutions of decision-making and oversight [37]. At
the global level, concerns of a ‘democratic deficit’ have
led to participation becoming a core element of the new
accountability agenda. As part of this new agenda, ac-
countability is being reframed to include participation as a
means to make power-wielders answerable to those af-
fected by their actions, or holding them to externally veri-
fiable standards or benchmarks. Moreover, the legitimacy
of international organisations is increasingly viewed as
dependent on the participation of actors beyond those
who have formal authority over an organisation; and it is
presented as a way to make these organisations more
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effective, develop better informed policy and improve im-
plementation [12,19,35].
Burall and Neligan outline four broad elements re-
quired to improve conditions for effective information
provision and enforceability, identified above as basic
requirements for accountability [10]. Termed both ‘di-
mensions’ and ‘principles’ by the authors, these elements
encompass broad mechanisms, that is, mechanisms for
participation, for transparency, for monitoring and evalu-
ation, along with complaints and redress procedures for
ensuring compliance. For participation to be effective,
structures need to be in place that provide relevant stake-
holders with opportunities to engage in decision-making,
setting standards and rules, monitoring processes or
responding to problems arising in finance, programme or
governance processes. Transparency refers to recording,
reporting and publishing of information in a timely man-
ner, including either proactive or reactive disclosure of
information. Monitoring and evaluation of organisations
and policies is important for assessing the operations and
effectiveness of programmes or organisations. Complaints
and redress mechanisms support compliance and enforce-
ment activities, such as judicial-style panels, ombudsman’s
offices or citizen juries.
Burall and Neligan emphasise ‘the ongoing, participative
nature of accountability’ [10]. Increasing participation in
the policy processes of international organisations is con-
sidered as offering transformative potential [9,35]. Partici-
pation in priority-setting, decision-making and oversight
comes with its own challenges however, not least with re-
gard to what form it should take, whether representative,
delegated or direct; who should be involved, through what
processes; as well as the feasibility of implementation at a
global level [9,12,19]. New global health initiatives like the
Global Fund are reflective of this changing demand, in-
corporating models of participation into their organisa-
tional structures that provide access for selected non-state
actors in decision-making and over-sight at both global
and country levels.
While the discussion above has concentrated on who,
what and how, we treat the where of accountability not
just in terms of specific institutional settings, but rather
as action areas or sub-fields common to the broader glo-
bal health policy field. As Buse and colleagues suggest,
health policies provide the overarching frameworks for
activities in global health, setting goals and shaping
‘courses of action (and inaction) that affect the set of in-
stitutions, organisations, services and funding arrange-
ments’ [39]. Borrowing from social and policy theory
[40,41], health policies can be viewed as both an out-
come of and guiding framework for field activity. Con-
sidered this way, the global health policy field possess
rules, functions and sets of issues deemed important to
its occupants. It is occupied by actors who differ in
terms of the amount and relative weight of economic,
social, political and symbolic capital they possess. This
structures the field by creating a hierarchy of relations
that gives actors more or less influence over what health
policy issues are deemed to be at stake, as well as deter-
mining who has the authority to hold others to account
and how. And like any field, the global health policy field
is comprised of interdependent subfields with a potential
to effect change in one another. Three particular sub-
fields of relevance to health policy processes are finance,
programme and governance subfields, where each has a
different focus and impacts on the others in a variety of
ways. These action areas or subfields have their own
subsets of policy-making issues to contend with, as well
as their particular policy processes and accountability
dynamics that constrain or enable different actors in
different way. In other words, the finance, programme,
and governance subfields each impact upon the overall
‘doing’ of global health policy and accountability.
As with the analysis of health policies [39], analysis of
accountability in the three policy subfields must also
examine and acknowledge the importance of actors, pro-
cesses and contextual factors that shape and influence
the implementation of accountability instruments. Be-
ginning with the financial subfield, questions regarding
the creation and implementation of financial account-
ability procedures, regimes and standards, and the values
that are embedded within them, are as important as the
procedures or regimes themselves. This might focus on,
for instance: the design and selection of auditing and
reporting tools to be utilised, who is authorised to use
them and whose information needs are being served; or
the processes and values underlying fiduciary principles
that define what and who can be financed, and from
what source. Secondly, the programme subfield refers to
more than monitoring and evaluating programme out-
comes. Also of relevance are the processes leading to the
incorporation of particular issues into programmes in
the first instance; the frameworks and specific targets for
evaluating programmes tasked with addressing those is-
sues; along with the policies and administrative structures
that shape the supply and delivery of services and the abil-
ity of actors to meet programme targets. Instruments of
accountability in programme activities are not politically
neutral, and the design and effects of those mechanisms
must also be examined. In the case of programme moni-
toring and evaluation, for example, these instruments may
in fact favour the information needs of some actors, such
as donors, possibly to the detriment of and financial cost
to governments in receipt of funds, as has sometimes
occurred in HIV/AIDS programming [42].
Finally, issues of governance are fundamental to the
health policy process, where political accountability
involves much more than states being accountable to
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citizens. Once the reserve of governments, there has
been a rearrangement of responsibilities and inclusion of
non-state actors in collective health decision-making set-
tings, a change that has been summed up “as represent-
ing the transition from a world of governments to a
world of governance” [39]. Bureaucratic, supervisory, fis-
cal and legal mechanisms have been supplemented by
newer market, peer and reputational instruments for
holding power-wielders and those with less power to ac-
count for their actions [12]. This in itself is seen by some
as a response to the ‘private turn’ in global governance
and health, the rise of partnerships as legitimate govern-
ance actors, and the accountability challenges this has
created [30].
Critics argue that governments and international insti-
tutions have compromised their own accountability
mechanisms by entering into partnerships with private
sector actors [16]. Others note however that partner-
ships have incorporated mechanisms to enhance their
internal governance models in ways that may in fact be
increasing the democratic nature of governance in global
and country settings, such as through stakeholder inclu-
sion or open-door board meetings [30]. These and other
questions are of relevance to accountability in the gov-
ernance subfield, the setting in which issues are priori-
tised, policies formulated, and where the governance
infrastructure itself determines who is involved in these
processes or how those involved can be held to account.
Brought together, the accountability mechanisms and
health policy subfields identified in the discussion above
provide basic elements for our conceptual map of ac-
countability (Figure 1). We have approached account-
ability in the context of global health cooperation as a
system of relations between different actors with varying
degrees of power and influence. Accountability is fre-
quently complex and not always reducible to linear rela-
tionships that are formed by the understandable need for
making recipients accountable for the use of donor funds.
As the following section illustrates, accountability rela-
tions between actors are complex, dense, and contingent
on their context. In practice, accountability has been
characterised as a ‘political theatre’ where institutional
structures, power asymmetries and inter-organisational
dynamics combine to ensure that “no single form of ac-
countability dominates” [9].
Illustrating accountability relations: the Global Fund
case study
The Global Fund provides a useful entry point to illus-
trate multiple accountability relations, while the sub-
fields identified (finance, programme, and governance)
provide an organising frame to discuss accountability is-
sues, and to highlight how accountability is an ongoing
process of learning, change and contestation. The Global
Fund is representative of the changing dynamics in glo-
bal health cooperation described earlier, and has incor-
porated elements of the new accountability agenda into
its operations, such as extending participation beyond
traditional state actors at the highest levels. The Global
Fund Board, for example, includes representatives from
donor and recipient governments, NGOs, affected com-
munities, multilateral organisations, the private sector,
and philanthropic organisations. As the supreme govern-
ing body, the Board develops organisational strategies,
oversees governance and finance activities, as well as
assesses performance and risk. In comparison to other
global health organisations, the Global Fund has been
described as one of the most open and transparent
[43,44], rated sixth in the 2013 Aid Transparency Index
of donors [45]. The organisation has been credited with
contributing to stronger health governance, increased
participation of diverse actors in health policy processes,
and improved responsiveness to country needs [46].
The purpose of the Global Fund is to attract, manage
and disburse additional resources to countries, and does
not implement or manage programmes itself. To that
end, the Global Fund relies on governments, NGOs and
other actors in countries to develop proposals and
implement programmes. From its inception, the Global
Fund’s approach to country engagement has been differ-
ent to most other international health organisations,
opting for country partnership mechanisms rather than
having country offices. Country Coordinating Mecha-
nisms (CCMs) are the preferred mechanism for proposal
development and entering into contractual relationships
with programme implementers. The CCM is the central
governance mechanism at country level, and is envi-
sioned as a country-level mirror of the public-private
Global Fund Board. The CCM is primarily responsible
for coordinating the development of proposals and sub-
mitting them to the Global Fund, as well as being respon-
sible for submitting funding requests after each evaluation
period. Since the launch of the Global Fund strategy for
2012–2016, the CCM has been charged with an increasing
grant oversight role, including overseeing grant imple-
mentation by the CCM-nominated Principal Recipient
(PR), and verifying that reporting and other requirements
are met [47].
While the CCM represents the governance structure
in countries, the PRs and Sub-Recipients (SRs) represent
the implementing functions. The Local Fund Agent (LFA)
represents an extension of the assurance function, verify-
ing financial and programmatic reports submitted by the
PRs to the Global Fund. LFAs are selected through com-
petitive bidding, and generally include global auditing
companies such as KPMG and PricewaterhouseCoopers.
PRs are legally responsible to the Global Fund, and must
cooperate with LFAs and CCMs. PRs report to the Global
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Fund Secretariat via the LFA and the CCM, while LFAs
report directly to the Global Fund Secretariat. From time
to time, the OIG may review activities in countries for the
purposes of identifying misuse of funds and detection of
fraud, waste or mismanagement in grants.
Accountability framed
Before covering the three subfields, we first outline how
accountability is framed by the Global Fund, and the
spaces where formal authority lies. The Global Fund
Framework Document interprets accountability in a spe-
cific way, as requiring “sound processes for specifying,
tracking and measuring programme results to ensure a
sufficient level of accountability” [48]. Crucially, it notes
that the “future financial viability of the Global Fund
will depend on being able to demonstrate results, ini-
tially in terms of coverage of activities and subsequently
in terms of outcomes”, whereby a system of accountabil-
ity is “needed to provide incentives to grant recipients
to achieve more, faster, and better results”. Grantees are
thus charged with delivering results, and need to be “ac-
countable to government, private sector and foundation
donors (for the use of funds, achievements of results)”.
The 2013 Global Fund Annual Financial Report details
the commitments of donors during the third Replenish-
ment Round, 2011–13. Commitments from donor gov-
ernments represented 93% of overall contributions, the
largest of which was from the United States Govern-
ment. Foundations and the private sector committed 5%
of overall contributions, while the remaining 2% came
from the Affordable Medicines Facility - Malaria (AMFm),
an initiative funded by the UK and Canadian govern-
ments, UNITAID and the Bill & Melinda Gates
Foundation. The future viability of the Global Fund there-
fore is dependent on incentivising grantees to generate re-
sults that satisfy the expectations of its donors, and donor
governments in particular who represent by far the largest
contributors to the organisation.
Not surprisingly, this positions donors as extremely
powerful actors in the accountability relationship. It is
reflective of a two-stage upward movement of financial
accountability, firstly from grantees to the Global Fund,
where enforcement relies on top-down monitoring to
identify financial mismanagement or corruption, discussed
later. The second stage is onward accountability to do-
nors, where withholding or withdrawing financial support
provides a powerful sanctioning and redress tool and can
be employed to change the behaviour of the organisation
to meet the demands of its donors. Barnes and Browne
see in this model of accountability an inbuilt tension and
potential imbalance of political influence: the Global Fund,
they argue, shares with traditional business models a
process of vertical prioritisation of accountability upwards
to donors, rather than horizontally to the multisectoral
partners involved [29].
Figure 2 highlights this vertical arrangement to illus-
trate who reports to whom, and who is vested with the
authority to demand reports and information internal to
the organisation. Primary reporting lines denote required
and regular reporting (solid lines), and are usually con-
tractually bound in grant or hiring agreements, or are
built into the terms and conditions of engagement. Sec-
ondary reporting (dotted lines) is less regularised, and is
usually in response to investigations or requests for in-
formation. Only some actors are empowered to request
or demand information. The Secretariat, for instance, is
Figure 1 Conceptual map of accountability.
Bruen et al. Globalization and Health 2014, 10:73 Page 7 of 15
http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/10/1/73
not in a position to request reports on the operation of
the Office of the Inspector General (OIG), while the
OIG is only charged with reporting to the Audit & Ethics
Committee of the Global Fund Board. The OIG on the
other hand can investigate or audit the operations of any
number of actors, including the Secretariat, and has the
authority to access all books and records maintained by
the Global Fund, and to seek any information from people
involved in the organisation’s projects.
In some ways, the accountability structure of the Global
Fund resembles a chain of technical Principal-Agent rela-
tions, from sub-recipients to donors. But while donors are
certainly the most powerful set of actors, the ‘political the-
atre’ and inter-organisational dynamics across the finance,
programme and governance subfields ensures this is more
than a simple Principal-Agent system of control and com-
pliance. We turn to these issues for the remainder of this
section to describe some of the tensions and challenges
between different actors in this relationship.
The finance subfield
The Technical Review Panel (TRP), which is part of
the global level governance of the Global Fund, plays
an important role in the financial subfield, though its
influence lies predominantly in the programme subfield
discussed later. Established as an independent expert ad-
visory panel, the TRP assesses requests for funding from
countries, presents its recommendations to the Board
for final decision, and thus starts a financial relationship
between the organisation and those receiving funds.
Once approved, grant agreements between the Global
Fund and the PRs establish the terms and conditions for
accountability in financial disbursement and use, procure-
ment requirements, as well as financial and programme
reporting. Financial and programme reporting are handled
separately, though are linked at certain points along the
process.
The World Bank, as Trustee, is responsible for man-
aging Global Fund monies, including making payments
to recipients at the instruction of the Secretariat, and re-
ports on financial management to the Board. During its
earliest years, all recipients of Global Fund finances had
to provide regular financial reports through the CCM to
the Trustee or an approved sub-trustee. The goal of the
Fund during this period was heavily focused on a rapid
expansion of resources, a rapid scale-up of programmes
and quickly demonstrating results – reflected in the ‘raise
it, spend it, prove it’ motto of the organisation’s first
Figure 2 Organisational and Reporting Structure of the Global Fund.
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director, Richard Feachem. Within a few years however,
concerns about financial accountability began to surface.
By July 2005, the Global Fund Board agreed to establish
an independent inspector office, with the Charter of the
Office of the Inspector General approved at the 13th Board
meeting in April 2006.
The establishment of the OIG underscored the im-
portance major donors to the Global Fund placed on up-
ward financial accountability for use of their finances,
and came about in part as a result of donor conditions
placed on their financial contributions to the organisa-
tion. Prior to the Board agreement, the US Congress
authorised withholding 25% of its contribution to the
Global Fund until it took steps to implement conditions
Congress deemed essential for improving the organisa-
tion’s accountability. The primary condition was the
establishment of “a full time, professional, independent
office which reports directly to the Global Fund Board
regarding, among other things, the integrity of processes
for consideration and approval of grant proposals, and
the implementation, monitoring and evaluation of grants
made by the Global Fund” [49]. Congress’ condition
remained in place for some time after the establishment
of the OIG, and it continued to enforce strong oversight
of its implementation during the initial years.
The creation of the OIG was prompted by the sanc-
tioning threat of the most powerful donor and reflected
the power of this donor to force the Global Fund to
adapt its behaviour and institutional composition. The
existence of the Office, regardless of what triggered it,
was also reflective of the Fund’s founding aim of ensur-
ing grantees were held accountable for their use of
donor finances, part of which rested on a commitment
to transparency and availability of evaluation reports.
However, apart from donor governments or organisa-
tions with the technical capacity to review these reports,
few organisations or people in countries have been in a
position to benefit from them, in part due to the com-
plexity and quantity of data and reports that makes them
less accessible or relevant for many [50]. Additionally,
up until recently a clause in the OIG charter meant that
only its external assurance and investigation work would
be made public, with internal investigations (such re-
views of the Secretariat) only available to the Executive
Director and the Audit & Ethics Committee. Barring ex-
ceptional circumstances, the Global Fund Board decided
at its 31st Meeting in March 2014 that all external and
internal reports of the OIG will be made public from
now on, though past reports will not be released [51].
The OIG evaluation and auditing mechanisms are es-
sentially funder-control mechanisms, regularly identify-
ing what it characterised as “losses” and reporting these
to the Global Fund and the Board. Once investigative
reports are finalised, they are publically posted to the
Global Fund website in pursuance of its transparency
goal, and redress mechanisms are instigated to retrieve
lost finances. The OIG has been criticized however for
failing to put losses into the context of the overall country
or Global Fund grant portfolio, creating an unbalanced
picture that ultimately led to claims that the Global Fund
itself was plagued with misappropriation and fraud [52].
Equally critically, the early years of the OIG was marred
with its own controversies, including findings that it only
partially conformed to international auditing standards,
that there were substantive questions over the quality and
professionalism of its work, and that there was no
mechanisms in place for PRs to lodge a complaint
against the OIG in cases where they felt they had been
poorly treated [53,54].
Concerns raised by the OIG on losses to the Fund
were picked up by the media in mid-2011. This triggered
a suspension of funding from donors, the establishment
of the High Level Independent Review Panel, and a series
of substantial reforms following the Panel’s recommenda-
tions [55]. An evaluation conducted by the Panel con-
firmed that the system of fiduciary control developed in
the founding years was inadequate and had not worked as
well as intended. For example, it found that almost every
grant had at least one financial management problem; that
the weaknesses in PRs could have been identified earlier;
and that significant governance, monitoring and evalu-
ation gaps existed among both country and multilateral
organisation PRs [54]. The bulk of the subsequent Global
Fund reforms have sought to address financial monitoring
shortfalls and to regain the confidence of donors. This has
also been supported through additional financial or
technical support aimed at widening participation in the
financial and programme subfields, enhancing country
and community-based monitoring systems, diversifying
the range of evaluators, and opening up additional chan-
nels for complaints and verification of results. Such
support has come from the French government-backed
Initiative 5%, GIZ BACKUP Initiative, Grant Management
Solutions, and the UNAIDS Technical Support Facility
among others.
The programme subfield
The Fund distinguishes between accountability in fi-
nance and programmes, though it recognises that clear
links exist between them. The Framework document
specifies that “monitoring of Global Fund grants will
focus on programmatic accountability: assessing the pro-
grammatic progress and public health impact of activities
supported by the Global Fund; and providing incentives
for improved performance”. CCMs are a critical link be-
tween the programme and governance fields. As the
Framework Document states [48], CCMs are the “focus
for programme accountability, depending on the Board’s
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decisions regarding overall Global Fund accountability
and fiduciary issues”. CCMs coordinate the development
and submission of national proposals, nominate the PR
and submit requests for continued funding, among other
responsibilities.
Once submitted, proposals are reviewed by the TRP,
which plays a particularly powerful role in influencing
what can be funded. Participation on the TRP is deter-
mined by the Strategy, Investment and Impact Commit-
tee, itself comprised of representatives from the different
donor and implementer blocs on the Board. Given its in-
fluential role, it is perhaps not surprising that various
criticisms have been directed against its members. There
have for instance been accusations that the expert panel
members were more sympathetic to donor concerns and
that this resulted in a ‘Western’ bias in approving appli-
cations from donor-preferred countries, though with
little empirical evidence to support such claims [29].
The TRP plays a crucial shaping role in determining
what health interventions should be prioritised, and re-
flects the changing policy priorities of different public
and private Board members. This has included approv-
ing AIDS treatment interventions at a time when there
was resistance from some donors and uncertainty around
their eligibility, as well recommending a narrow scope of
eligible health systems strengthening activities, scaling
back to the disease-specific focus which some viewed as
the organisation’s core mandate, though which others cri-
ticised [56]. The TRP is not alone in influencing what can
be financed, as donors too have used effective veto powers
such as withholding funds to bring about programme
priorities they favoured. For instance, under the Bush
Administration, the US insisted that generic HIV/AIDS
medicines had to be cleared by the US Food and Drug
Administration before it was willing to pay for them, a
move that was seen by some on the Board as delaying
decision-making and weakening the participative and
deliberative processes of the organisation [57].
Once applications have been approved, grant recipi-
ents are monitored as part of a performance-based fi-
nancing model, an incentive-based mechanism that aims
to establish a new standard of accountability [43,48]. As
a technical tool, performance-based financing ties future
funding to measurement and quantification of results,
with countries expected to define the targets and recipi-
ents expected to reach them. This model has been viewed
as a way for strengthening country management and in-
formation systems, as well as creating incentives to scale
up programmes and delivery of services [58]. It has simul-
taneously raised concerns regarding how pressure to meet
numerical coverage targets may negatively impact the
quality of health services [29]. Indeed, a review of the
Global Fund in 2011 recommended that it shift its atten-
tion to quality and outcomes rather than focusing on
quantity and outputs, and that monitoring and evaluation
systems should themselves be reviewed due to data-
quality concerns [54].
As noted above, LFAs are contracted by the Global
Fund to monitor implementation, verify programmatic
results reported by PRs, and to oversee and report on
grant performance. As such, they have considerable influ-
ence on the programme and decision-making processes of
the Global Fund, especially with respect to continuation
of funding based on what LFAs report [29]. LFAs have
been criticised for relying on results reported by PRs ra-
ther than conducting on-site verifications, with the quality
of reporting and LFA recommendations coming under
serious questioning [59]. Despite their critical role, the
work done by many LFAs has been expensive, has not
adequately linked fiduciary and programme information,
and has often been poorly tailored to the country contexts
and specific risks associated with grants [54]. Overall,
assessments of LFA performance has shown it to been
uneven and inconsistent, with sanctioning mechanisms
for firing LFAs for incompetence only in place since 2009
[54,59]. The terms of reference for engaging and approv-
ing LFAs were updated in 2013 as part of the Global Fund
reforms. In order to be approved by the Global Fund,
LFAs are now required to have or be able to access pro-
grammatic expertise so as to monitor and link financial
and programme performance.
The success of Global Fund programmes is dependent
on different actors across all levels, from community to
global. At the community level, the organisation rolled
out targeted funding for community systems strengthen-
ing in 2008 in an effort to increase programme impact
through support for community-based organisations
and increase participation of these organisations in
national programme reviews and evaluations [60,61].
The Global Fund is also dependent on technical and
development partners like the WHO, UN Development
Programme and other public and private partners to
increase programme impact and to support the work of
grant recipients. Managing this has sometimes proven
difficult. These technical partners are powerful actors in
their own right, with their own mandates, budget
constraints, accountability structures, sectoral and com-
peting interests. It has often proven politically and insti-
tutionally challenging to move beyond the current
goodwill-based model of partnership towards more
formal arrangements.
In December 2010, the Comprehensive Reform Work-
ing Group was established by the Global Fund Board to
develop a reform agenda for the organisation. Presenting
its report to the Board in May 2011, the Working Group
recommended that the Board improve oversight of
partnership objectives, review the approach to funding
technical assistance, and highlighted the need for
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formalising agreements and the accountability of part-
ners to the Global Fund and in-country actors [62]. The
High Level Independent Review Panel reiterated this need,
highlighting that the Global Fund suffers from “inadequate
information-sharing and technical cooperation, both at
the working level in-country, and inter-institutionally”
[54]. Recognizing this, the Global Fund Strategy 2012–16
included reference to the need for improving the provision
of technical assistance for programme impact and clarify-
ing relations of accountability at global, regional and
country levels as a going concern [47]. The Global Fund
has begun to develop or enter into a series of agreements
with these partners, including a cooperation agreement
with the WHO in May 2014 that formalizes how both or-
ganisations will support countries with grant applications
in the New Funding Model process.
While the discussion has been primarily focused on
accountability relations in the Global Fund programme
subfield, a point worth making is that donors, multilat-
eral organisations and initiatives like the Global Fund
each exert considerable and competing influence over
programme priority-setting and implementation in coun-
tries - they can realign the health priorities of countries to
reflect their own objectives; yet there is little by way of ac-
countability for the effects of these interventions, regard-
less of whether they are positive or negative [63]. The
monitoring and accountability of these more powerful
actors receives significantly less priority than that of less
powerful actors, and effective redress mechanisms for
holding these and other influential actors to account are
limited or lacking at both global and national levels
[27,64]. While efforts have been made to advance donor
accountability to country-led structures and programmes
through mutual accountability compacts, it remains
patchy, with donor priorities and activities continuing
to be poorly aligned with many country health priorities
and processes [17].
The governance subfield
In terms of governance, the Global Fund has sought to
develop a different structure to many other organisa-
tions, particularly regarding who participates in its gov-
ernance activities. The governance of the Global Fund
works at two inter-related levels, globally through the
Board, and at country level through the CCMs. At the
global level, this involves Board membership for a wide
spectrum of actors from the public and private sector,
some of whom have large delegations to support the
work of their representatives, while others do not. The
organisation is particularly noteworthy for having given
voting rights to NGO delegations and for opening up
opportunities for deliberative-decision making. Initially
without a vote, the delegation of NGOs representing
communities affected by the three diseases gained voting
rights on the Board by 2004, giving them the same rights
as the two other NGO delegations, states, private sector,
and private foundations.
Assessing the robustness of the deliberative processes
is difficult, in part due to the complex decision-making
and governance arrangements in the Global Fund. None-
theless, claims have been made suggesting that small
groups of powerful states have used formal and informal
channels to gain greater advantage in decision-making
and priority setting in ways that challenge the deliberative
intent of the multisectoral Board [57]. Moreover, concerns
have been expressed that the reforms triggered by donors
suspending funds in 2011 in the wake of fraud claims have
risked alienating civil society engagement from these
reform processes, which have instead concentrated on
bringing donor confidence back to the organisation [65].
More recent proposals for introducing a tiered pricing
framework have received similarly critical reactions, not
least because the proposal had apparently been developed
in a closed fashion that excluded input from many low
and middle-income governments and civil society organi-
sations and where no official information was publicly
disclosed [66].
At country level, the Global Fund has tasked CCMs
with being the primary mechanism with responsibility
for in-country governance, decision-making and coord-
ination. Ideally, CCMs should include a broad represen-
tation of state and non-state actors. To this end, the
Fund promotes wider participation than many other
initiatives at country level, and has exposed participatory
weaknesses in existing structures like National AIDS
Councils [67]. In opting for having no country presence
or office, the Global Fund delegates responsibility to
country mechanisms in an effort to promote country
ownership for setting priorities and implementing policy,
albeit within the confines of the priorities established at
the global level of the organisation. The legitimacy of
CCMs is therefore dependent on their inclusivity, as well
as their performance. Until recently however, CCMs had
no formal and regular monitoring arrangement within
the Global Fund structure, while engagement with the
Secretariat during funding rounds provided only minimal
opportunity for assessment of CCM governance activities.
While CCMs have the potential to increase country-
ownership and participatory decision-making, in-depth
studies have found numerous problems. For example,
the report from the High Level Independent Review
Panel [54] noted that “all too often, CCMs only pay lip
service to inclusive decision-making, and do not exercise
genuine or meaningful oversight of grants in action”. In
keeping with the light-touch approach of the Global
Fund, issues of governance, participation, transparency,
selection of financial recipients, efficient resource use
and evaluation were often left to the CCMs to establish
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themselves, which few CCMs did or had the capacity to
do [54]. For example, no effective accountability mecha-
nisms or structural safeguards to ensure multisectoral
participation were found to have operated within the
Peru CCM during the 2004–2007 period [68]. Indeed,
no policies were reported to have existed with respect to
preventing, defining or managing conflicts of interest
even where many representatives on the CCM also repre-
sented organisations in receipt of Global Fund finances.
Additionally, there was little evidence of effective commu-
nication between CCM representatives and those they
claimed to represent, resulting in a failure to disseminate
information necessary for holding CCM decision-makers
to account.
CCMs in several countries have long suffered from
participatory and transparency limitations, raising con-
cerns about how participants are selected, how decisions
are taken, and whether CCMs undermine or strengthen
the legitimacy of the funding process [69,70]. CCMs do
at least provide a potential means of formalising greater
social participation in proposal development, decision-
making and implementation processes. This has in some
cases facilitated greater state accountability with respect
to increasing access to health services for a wider set of
people, as was more recently reported in Peru [71].
While CCMs are cited as a reflection of the Global
Fund Board, they also reflect to a great extent the institu-
tional arrangements in countries and relations between
actors. Programme weaknesses, governance challenges or
wider inequalities that already exist within different coun-
try contexts inevitably play out in the activities of the
CCMs, including limits on the influence of the commu-
nity sector [72]. The Global Fund does however have
power to tackle some governance challenges in countries,
at least where it relates to its own work. Gomez and Atun
[73], for instance, argue that the Global Fund played a sig-
nificant role in transforming health governance in Brazil.
Global Fund finances and conditions were found to have
raised the profile of the three diseases in ways that in-
creased political commitment to TB in particular, a rela-
tively neglected disease in Brazil. Moreover, it facilitated
harmonization of intra-bureaucratic relations, as well as
strengthening ties between state and municipal author-
ities, NGOs and national programmes. Fundamental for
increasing participation, Global Fund financing was
seen as encouraging “the emergence of new civic move-
ments, participation, and the creation of new municipal
participatory institutions designed to monitor the
disbursement of funds for Global Fund grants” [73].
The authors caution however that pre-existing political
commitment and an effective health movement in Brazil
were major factors for governance success, highlighting
how context matters and needs to be understood to
ensure desired health policy outcomes are realised.
Under the New Funding Model of the Global Fund,
minimum standards for core CCM functions will apply
and be monitored from January 2015, providing poten-
tial opportunities for improving the participation and
policy effectiveness of CCMs. Additionally, the Global
Fund recently launched a 10 country pilot project to in-
crease engagement of key affected populations in coun-
try dialogue processes and in developing concept notes
for applying for funding through the New Funding Model.
As noted by Garmaise, the “intent of the initiative is to
strengthen the ability of CCMs to identify programmatic
gaps and intervention needs, and to create “safe spaces”
for key affected populations, especially those who are
criminalised and marginalised, to engage in the process.”
[74]. Enhancing community participation in governance
activities may also help to capitalize on the unique oppor-
tunity that CCMs offer, namely the potential for gaining a
greater degree of input from among a wider set of stake-
holders regarding what Global Fund money should be
spent on, at least in the context of its disease-specific
focus [70,75].
Conclusion
Accountability is a frequently invoked though arguably
less frequently questioned concept in global health co-
operation. By critically engaging with the concept and
questioning how it is put into practice in light of recent
changes to the global health landscape, this paper charts
some of the changing dynamics and emerging features
of a new accountability agenda. While accountability is
about holding actors responsible for their actions, the
processes through which this might be done vary sub-
stantially, and differ by the policy action area or subfield
in which it takes place, whether finance, programme or
governance. We suggest that these subfields form the
core constituent parts of broader health policy processes
and organisational activities; and that each has their own
hierarchy of actors and set of policy issues, accountabil-
ity dynamics and concerns to contend with. It is useful
therefore to examine how accountability is practiced in
these policy subfields, where different types of account-
ability battle for recognition and where clear tensions
exist. Our focus in this paper is not so much about who
ought to be accountable to whom, an important norma-
tive line of questioning in its own right. Instead, we have
emphasised how accountability in global health is a
complex problem, not necessarily reducible to one set of
actors holding another to account, but is rather an
ongoing process with built-in tensions that continually
shape relations between a diverse set of actors.
The Global Fund is representative of the changing dy-
namics of global health cooperation, and provides a use-
ful case study for illustrating accountability relations in
global health policy processes. The organisation is both
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an accountability seeker and giver, demanding results
from those in receipt of its finances, and dependent on
the generation and communication of results to ensure
financing from its donors. As such, the organisation must
manage and is part of a complex system of relations, one
in which an inherent double-accountability tension can be
observed. The Global Fund’s multi-stakeholder partnership
model is challenged by a competing delegation model, that
is, a model of accountability where organisational and in-
stitutional structures prioritise accountability to those do-
nors who have delegated and entrusted it with powers [29].
This should not however be taken to suggest that do-
nors act as a coherent bloc directing the Global Fund.
Indeed, donor constituency members have differed sub-
stantially or even clashed behind the scenes regarding
the health interventions to be prioritised, and the deliv-
ery modalities to be used [20,28,76]. Moreover, donor
agencies are influenced in their domestic settings by
NGOs, companies and other actors that provide infor-
mation or lobby intensely for particular policy issues and
reforms to be prioritised in foreign aid activities. Within
the Global Fund, participation and transparency mecha-
nisms have formalised access for a greater number of ac-
tors to influence activities across the financial, programme
and governance subfields, not only as donor, NGO or
other constituencies, but also through cross-constituency
coalitions allied through shared concerns. In a relatively
short time, the Global Fund has made a major impact on
the three diseases – AIDS, TB and malaria. Its multisec-
toral partnership model – incorporating stakeholders who
previously were not represented at the ‘high table’ – has
been credited with facilitating this, which has in turn pro-
vided a source of legitimacy for the organisation. None-
theless, managing a complex system of relations means
not only working to regain the confidence of donors by
improving accountability in the finance and programme
subfields, but also ensuring a strong multisectoral partner-
ship that does not alienate or leave some constituencies
missing-in-action from key governance processes.
It is too early to assess if or how the Global Fund has
transformed accountability in global health cooperation.
However, organisations like the Global Fund who invoke
participatory and transparency principles must manage,
with some finesse, a complex set of competing account-
ability relations and mechanisms across different health
policy subfields. This is necessary not only for their
future financial viability but also for future legitimacy as
multisectoral partnerships, particularly if seeking to fulfil
participatory promises rather than limiting and instru-
mentalising the participation of some actors for its own
legitimacy purposes.
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